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ABSTRACT. This article argues that social networks constitute an inauthentic form of
sociality. The two component concepts of this claim, inauthenticity and sociality,
are explored in order to avoid some widespread misinterpretations. Inauthenticity
is examined on the basis of the relevant sections in Heidegger’s Being and Time, first
with respect to its main characteristics, then in terms of what motivates it and its
benefits,  and finally  with respect  to  its  status as  a non-normative  concept.  The
second part of the paper explores sociality. Here, a main emphasis is the way in
which my body imposes constraints on my social relations in the here and now,
which virtuality appears to overcome. Yet such an escape from corporeality is not
ultimately possible. The third and final part takes the analysis to the wider level of
world,  that  is,  our  current  historical  world  which  has  given  rise  to  such  an
understanding of sociality. 
When celebrities comment on the dangers of social networks, they often appear
old-fashioned, or paranoid, or both. For example, German singer Udo Jürgens
lamented the fact that what makes its way on to the Internet also stays there,
somewhere, still retrievable.1 It is worrisome that anybody can write anything –
truth or lies – about anybody else, which opens up the possibility of a kind of
universal virtual “mobbing” that actress Uschi Glas has described as a «public
stoning  [öffentliche  Steinigung]».2 These  possibilities  are  created  by a  lack of
censorship  as  well  as  by  the  severe  difficulties  involved  in  attributing
responsibility for what has been said (since those who create the posts can take
on virtual identities). Of course, this same lack of censorship also has effects on
the quality of writing.
The issue of appearing old-fashioned is important for framing the discussion
in  the  right  way.  It  is  by  no  means  the  purpose  of  the  current  article  to
1 Süddeutsche Zeitung, March 23, 2011.
2  DIE ZEIT, February 23, 2014.
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recommend abstinence from the Internet or from contemporary information
technologies. The advantages of these technologies for everyday life, research,
and information in the widest sense are enormous. In general,  it  is  not  the
purpose of  the current  article  to provide any recommendations about what
should  or  should  not  be  done,  in  line  with  the  non-normative  concept  of
inauthenticity as explained below.     
Yet this article puts forward the claim that social networks are an inauthentic
form  of  sociality.  This  claim  will  be  unfolded  in  such  a  way  as  to  avoid
simplistic conclusions and implications. The first part of the article explains the
main  thesis  by  examining  social  networks  in  light  of  Heidegger’s
considerations on inauthenticity. This part has three subsections, which move
from the main characteristics of inauthenticity to the underlying motivations or
advantages of inauthenticity,  before proposing that inauthenticity should, in
line with what Heidegger himself insists, be read as a non-normative concept.
The second part tackles the topic of sociality by first focussing on corporeality,
from which virtual reality appears to free us, and then discusses how such an
escape is illusory. The third and final section explores the theme in relation to
our contemporary world in order to show that inauthenticity should not be
understood in terms of what an individual does or does not do, but rather in
terms of  how it  reflects  the understanding of  sociality  that  determines  our
historical world.
1. Inauthenticity
In this  section, I  will  explain why social  networks qualify as an inauthentic
form of sociality. This will be done by first following and applying Heidegger’s
analysis of inauthenticity in Being and Time before expanding on the topic more
generally.
First, a brief note on terminology and translation. Translators and scholars
largely  agree  on  “authenticity”  and  “inauthenticity”  as  the  terms  for
translating Heidegger’s “Eigentlichkeit” and “Uneigentlichkeit”. This translation
indeed strikes me as appropriate both in general and for the purposes of this
article. It is often noted that the German “eigentlich” has the connotations of
true,  actual  and  genuine.  These  meanings  are  indeed  relevant  for  our
reflections.  Yet  it  might seem particularly unsurprising that social  networks
would present a case of inauthentic sociality in the sense of “not actual” or “not
genuine” sociality, since they are obviously  virtual. However, virtuality is not
what  is  usually  meant  by  inauthenticity,  and  in  relation  to  the  claim  put
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forward here, it is important to note that while the virtuality of social networks
is undisputed, it is usually assumed that despite this virtuality, social networks
are real or genuine as far as their sociality is concerned. In other words, it is
assumed that genuine sociality between virtual parties is at stake. 
The claim put forward here is instead that the sociality of social networks is
not  genuine;  it  is  inauthentic  in  Heidegger’s  sense.  In  order  to  understand
Heidegger’s  concept  of  inauthenticity,  it  is  crucial  to  note  that  despite  the
privative prefix “in-” Heidegger is here describing our normal, general, most
everyday way of being. There is something not quite genuine in how we always
already  are,  because  we  behave  how  everybody  behaves  without  asking
whether  there  are  good  reasons  for  acting  in  these  ways  and  without
investigating whether our comportment is in line with or conducive to what we
actually  want.  Yet,  as  Heidegger  also  affirms,  we  have  “valid”  –  that  is,
existentially  plausible  –  reasons  for  this  kind  of  evasive  behaviour.  These
reasons are connected to our finitude, the groundlessness of our existence, the
absence of universal principles and the corresponding difficulties in coming to
grips with existential questions concerning the relevance and meaning of our
actions.  We will  return to  the  motivations  behind inauthenticity  below.  For
now, we are concerned with its main characteristics.
1.1 Main Characteristics
The  first  characteristic  of  inauthenticity  as  discussed  in  Being  and  Time is
distantiality (Abständigkeit).3 As we operate in the world like everybody else
does, we are concerned to not fall  back behind others. Our existence in this
mode is determined by the fact that we compare ourselves with others, making
sure that we do not compare badly. This characteristic is brought to a simple
yet  powerful  level  in  social  networks,  since  our  social  relations  here  are
quantified. The number of “friends”, “followers”, “likes”, “clicks”, and “hits”
are given explicitly. Moreover, these numbers are themselves made public, and
as  a  result,  others  can  also  see  how  I  compare,  thus  making  it  virtually
impossible not to care. Luckily, there are ways to improve our “score” in this
respect; but this only confirms the inauthentic character of measuring sociality
in this fashion.4
The  next  defining  characteristic  of  inauthenticity  is  a  delivering  of  my
3 See HEIDEGGER 2010, Being and Time [abbreviated BT throughout this essay], p. 126.
4 One of the most convenient ways for PhD students to make money from home without any special
computer  skills  is  by manipulating in  certain ways  the numbers of  clicks  and connections  that
impact on search engines and similar tools.
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existence  to  the  others  that  Heidegger  calls  «subservience  [Botmäβigkeit]».5
Heidegger explains how the others to whom I hand over my existence are not
definite others, but a kind of neutral or anonymous multiplicity of others. This
captures the character of social networks quite well, since the frame in which
members encounter each other is pre-set in an anonymous fashion. Even for
those networks in which my profile is only visible to my “friends”, I cannot be
sure which of these friends might spread information about myself – and there
is also the possibility that profiles may have been corrupted. Furthermore, we
know by now that the secret services of countries such as the United States and
Britain have access in principle to everything that is presented and exchanged
on the Internet, and this would hold for some other countries as well, though
perhaps not as fully and universally. But since “everybody” is doing it,  and
“they”  do not  seem to  be  concerned,  why would  I be?  In  this  way,  I  have
delivered my existence – especially my virtual one – to the “they”; but luckily I
do not need to worry about this because nobody else is worried. 
Heidegger points to the «dictatorship» of the “they”,6  but he also discusses
how  inauthenticity  unburdens  us.  It  is  the  unburdening  character  of
inauthenticity that makes it powerful and thus consolidates its  dictatorship.
The dictatorship comes about because the character of the “they” is so neutral
that nobody takes responsibility and there is thus nobody to whom one can
turn for questions or complaints. The result bears some resemblance to certain
scenarios from Kafka’s writings. The power of the “they” crucially depends on
its pervasiveness: everybody, at least in his or her everyday existence, is a part
of it. To be sure, the same does not hold for social networks: not everybody is a
member. But those who are not members do not have access to certain pieces of
information. Companies, businesses and institutions nowadays have Facebook
pages, and while it certainly remains possible to simply admit to not having
such access – thus appearing old-fashioned – it is much more difficult to give a
brief7 explanation for  not  wanting to  become a member.  In  this  way,  social
networks “level down” (einebnen) exceptions and ensure that most everyone, or
at least the “average” person, is a member.8 
1.2 Benefits of Inauthenticity
When it comes to the assets or advantages conferred by inauthenticity, different
levels need to be considered, from the more superficial to the deeper. In order
5 BT, p. 126.
6 BT, p. 126.
7 Shorter than writing an essay, that is.
8 See BT, p. 127.
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to explain the role of the “they”, Heidegger points out that we enjoy, read, see
and judge the way they do.9 We let them decide for us what appears worth
reading  and  seeing,  and  what  provides  pleasure  and  enjoyment.  On  the
Internet, we are constantly alerted to the most viewed YouTube clips, the most
read articles, the numbers of hits and clicks, and we are told that others who
like what we do  also like this and that. Undoubtedly, this can be helpful in a
number of ways and can alert me to options and alternatives I would not have
noticed otherwise. But from the time of Socrates and Plato we have known that
majority  agreement  does  not  guarantee  truth  or  even  quality.  Furthermore,
these are self-perpetuating mechanisms as well as being mechanisms that are
open to manipulation. 
Our desire to explore what others have seen and read is not just based on the
sense  that  it  might  save us  time or  alert  us  to  options  we would not  have
noticed otherwise. This desire is based on the urge to stay “up to date”, which
in turn is grounded in a craving for newness and sensation.10 On the level of
“normal” sociality, this craving manifests itself in questions like “what’s up?”
and “what’s new?” and in the hunger for gossip. Our hunger for newness and
sensation is based on what Heidegger treats  under the heading of curiosity
(Neugier).  Our  everyday  existence  is  determined  by  curiosity.  Curiosity,  as
Heidegger explains, expresses the desire simply to perceive, in contrast to what
goes on in our practical life, especially in the world of work. When we rest –
and resting, of course, is already in itself desirable – our circumspection is no
longer caught up in the work-world, but is free. Free for what? We are free to
see without any specific purpose, meaning that «Dasein lets itself be intrigued
by just the outward appearance of the world».11 Curiosity sees for the sake of
seeing, not out of genuine interest in what it sees. As a result, there is no need
to stay with what is seen; curiosity swiftly moves on, thriving on the possibility
of distraction (Zerstreuung).12 
Curiosity is far removed from philosophy. «Curiosity has nothing to do with
the  contemplation  that  wonders  at  being,  thaumazein,  it  has  no  interest  in
wondering to the point of not understanding».13 Curiosity collects all sorts of
curious facts; it does not pause to contemplate the bigger ontological picture,
which can evoke wonder at the realisation that there is something rather than
nothing,  and  that  we  can  neither  fully  understand  this  something  nor
9 See BT, pp. 126-7.
10 Psychologists  have  named  the  corresponding  condition  “Fear  of  Missing  out  (FoMo)”.  See
PRZYBYLSKI ET AL. 2013.
11 BT, p. 172.
12 See BT, p. 129.
13 BT, p. 172. 
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comprehend how it comes about.  Wonder brings about philosophy whereas
curiosity  only  gives  rise  to  more  curiosity.  Furthermore,  curiosity  is
«everywhere and nowhere», it «uproots»14 Dasein – and it thus thrives on the
uprootedness or non-location of virtual space.
Yet to fully understand the attraction of inauthenticity, we need to move to an
even  deeper  level  and  ask  what  makes  distraction,  newness,  and  the
deliverance of responsibility so appealing. In other words, what is it that we are
running away from when we flee into inauthenticity? According to Heidegger,
we  are  fleeing  from  the  nothing  that  always  threatens  the  “there  is
(something)”.  More  precisely,  on  the  level  of  existence,  I  am  engaged in  a
constant flight from the nothing that concerns my existence, namely death. The
realisation of  the fact  of  my finitude – that  my existence is  of  a  temporary
rather than a permanent nature – gives rise to anxiety. Busying myself in lots of
activities and pursuing distraction just as they do will hopefully make me as
unconcerned about finitude as they seem to be. Being curious about gossip and
newness suspends questions of meaning and an engagement with the (very old
rather than new) fact that all of us are mortal.
Finitude is a problem for our existence because the fact that we will die casts
doubt on the meaningfulness and relevance of my engagements in the here and
now. If neither God nor some universal and eternal perspective stabilises the
meaning of existence, nihilism becomes a special challenge. The source of these
doubts is the fact of my mortality, but the circumstances of how death assails
us create an even bigger emotional challenge. The fact that we do not know
when or how we will die contributes to the anxiety we feel in relation to our
finitude. Inauthenticity thus emerges as a response to certain features of our
existence, namely its finitude and the threat of the nothing, and this already
indicates that inauthenticity is not unequivocally a “bad” thing. As we will see
presently, it is not a thing for which the designation “bad” makes much sense.
1.3 Inauthenticity as Non-Normative
Heidegger states that the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity is
«not moralizing».15 He does not tell us what we “should not do.” Similarly, he
maintains  that  inauthenticity  does  not  constitute  a  «negative  evaluation».16
Inauthenticity is not something “bad”, something we should avoid. These are
the kinds of remarks many interpreters contest. Despite Heidegger’s insistence
14 BT, p. 173.
15 BT, p. 167.
16 BT, p. 175.
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that inauthenticity is neither moralizing nor evaluative, many commentaries on
Being and Time read the distinction as an evaluative one, and interpreters tend
to  claim  that  Heidegger  considers  authenticity  to  be  morally  superior  to
inauthenticity. If an argument is provided for this conviction at all, Heidegger’s
“tone” is usually invoked as evidence.17 Yet the “tone” of an author does not
suffice  as  a  philosophical  argument;  “tone”  is  a  vague  category,  open  to
interpretations and intuitions of various kinds. Furthermore, such readings are
presumptuous,  since  they  imply  that  either  Heidegger  is  not  sincere  when
claiming that the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity is to be
read in a neutral fashion, or that he fails to understand his own project. Instead,
the current reading attempts to take Heidegger’s work and words seriously.
One reason why the distinction should indeed not be considered moralizing
is that it is not clear what such an evaluation would even entail, how it would
be motivated, and how it would be justified. If inauthenticity is “bad” then we
need to know what “bad” means, and we preferably need a moral theory or
system to understand the claim. Phenomenology cannot rely on such theories
and  systems  unless  they  emerge  from  the  phenomenological  enquiry;
otherwise, we are confronted with an unmotivated presupposition. 
Overall,  it  seems  that  inauthenticity  and  authenticity  are  more  closely
intertwined  than  most  interpreters  assume.  Heidegger  states:  «Authentic
Being-one’s-Self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a
condition  that  has  been  detached  from  the  “they”  [Man];  it  is  rather  an
existentiell  modification  of  the  “they”».18 Authenticity  is  not  separated  or
detached from inauthenticity. A modification of a certain state implies that the
modified  state  does  not  fully  disappear,  but  continues  to  exist,  albeit  in  a
modified fashion. 
In this article, inauthenticity is understood as the state of existence in which
we always already and usually find ourselves. It is a state we take for granted,
and phenomenology can serve to undermine this taken-for-grantedness and to
put into question our common convictions. In the previous section, we saw that
there  are  definite  advantages  to  inauthenticity,  or  plausible  reasons  that
motivate us to exist in that fashion. Once we have understood those reasons, it
becomes more difficult or less enjoyable to remain in the state of inauthenticity;
yet it is even more difficult to see what the alternative would be. Authenticity is
an  extremely  enigmatic  concept,  and  because  of  this  it  seems  appropriate
rather than a shortcoming that Heidegger says so little about it. 
Furthermore, it seems that Heidegger uses the terminology of authenticity in
17 E.g., ADORNO 2003, p. 427.
18 BT, p. 130 (a very similar statement can be found on p. 267).
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Being  and  Time  in  different  ways.  When  Heidegger  asks  what  a  certain
phenomenon “eigentlich” or authentically amounts to, he is asking for a more
fundamental  understanding  of  that  phenomenon  (and  such  a  question  is
usually easier to tackle than the question of an authentic  existence).  But do
attributes  like  “deeper”  and  “more  fundamental”  not  point  exactly  to  the
superiority  of  authenticity?  Admittedly,  authenticity  is  “better”  than
inauthenticity if  “better” means “more disclosive.” Yet  this  observation is  a
tautology when starting from authenticity  as a  methodological  designation,
that  is,  as  a  questioning  of  first  appearances  and  a  revealing  of  deeper
dimensions of a given phenomenon. Moreover, the usual meaning of “better”
is not “more disclosive”, but carries moral implications which we, following
Heidegger, would like to avoid. 
To put it quite bluntly: being inauthentic does not make somebody a morally
reprehensible person. In fact it becomes quite difficult to see, on the basis of a
phenomenological project, what morality even amounts to. Ethics is a different,
more interesting yet more complex issue, and Heidegger’s considerations on
the  call  of  conscience  are  quite  elucidatory  in  this  respect.  But  rushed
conclusions about a moral  dimension to inauthenticity must  in any case be
avoided.  It  seems  quite  likely  that  Heidegger’s  abandonment  of  the
authenticity/inauthenticity distinction after  Being and Time (even though he
continues to use the adjective “eigentlich” in certain contexts) is a way of trying
to  avoid  those  misunderstandings  that  emerge  especially  from  an
individualising understanding of authenticity and inauthenticity. It would be
more useful  to consider them in the context  of  a  world,  that  is,  a  cultural-
historical world. The point is not to ask, “How can I break out of an inauthentic
form of sociality?” (and it should not be assumed that it would make or prove
me  to  be  a  better  person  if  I  did),  but  rather,  “What  does  a  certain
understanding  of  sociality  show  about  us,  and  especially  about  our
contemporary world as the world in which we currently always already find
ourselves?”
The third part  of  this  essay will  thus move the discussion to the level  of
world. However, both in order to understand world better and to examine the
topic of social networks as an inauthentic form of sociality more thoroughly,
our  next  topic  will  be  sociality.  So  far,  we  have  seen  that  the  main
characteristics  of  inauthenticity  provided  by  Heidegger’s  analysis  apply  to
social networks, and we have seen what makes inauthenticity so attractive from
an  existential  perspective.  In  order  to  see  more  fully  how  social  networks
indeed constitute an inauthentic form of sociality, it seems appropriate to now
reverse  direction  and  proceed  “up”,  from  the  deepest  level  of  existential
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finitude to the more mundane level of everyday engagements, and see more
precisely how the attraction of inauthenticity plays out in terms of our social
relations. 
To this end, we need to expand the analysis and move beyond Heidegger’s
explicit  reflections.  This  is  not  surprising,  since  Heidegger  could  not  have
considered virtual  reality,  and even sociality was not  considered by him in
much detail, as subsequent French phenomenologists like Jean-Paul Sartre and
Emmanuel  Levinas  repeatedly  pointed  out.  Furthermore,  examining  the
relation between “normal” sociality and social networks requires attending to
the role of the body, which does not receive much attention in Being and Time.19
Yet  it  is  on  the  basis  of  Heideggerian  resources  that  we  will  expand  his
considerations.
2. Sociality
Ordinary social relations are relations from Dasein to Dasein. When Heidegger
points  out  that  our existence is  always and essentially  Mitsein,  Being-with(-
others), this is the case because our existence is defined by world (as existence
is  Being-in-the-world),  and world is  shared world in which the presence of
others plays a crucial role. Furthermore, my existence is embodied, as is the
Other’s. Husserl’s approach to the relation between perceiving the Other and
perceiving their body is particularly helpful for reflections on the social body,
which  is  our  concern  here.  Admittedly,  Husserl’s  text  has  evoked  much
criticism since his description focuses on establishing an analogy between my
body and the  Other’s;  but  upon  closer  consideration,  the  situation  is  more
complicated than Husserl’s critics admit.20 The role of the body for our social
relations is not that we first perceive a body as if it were a mere physical object
and then also establish that this body seems sufficiently similar to mine to start
exploring a social relation. Rather, a social relation is a relation of interaction,
and this interaction happens on an embodied level. Social interaction involves
relating to each other on the bodily level, and it means communicating with
each other, where ears play a paradigmatic role, as in the line from Hölderlin’s
19 Closer consideration would show that the body does emerge as a topic in  Being and Time, though
mostly  indirectly  by  way  of  notions  such  as  ready-to-hand  (zuhanden)  and  present-at-hand
(vorhanden), which cannot be understood without reference to our body as the way in which we are
embedded in and relate to our closest environing world (Umwelt). Nonetheless, other thinkers such
as Husserl and Levinas are more useful for our purposes in the next section since we are more
concerned here with the social body or the body in relation to others than with the practical body.
20 See STAEHLER 2008.
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“Friedensfeier” that Heidegger places emphasis on: «Since we are a conversation
and can hear  from one  another».21 Communication is  not  limited to  verbal
language,  and  the  conversation  is  not  just  from  mouth  to  ear,  but  more
generally from body to body.
2.1 Corporeality
Corporeality  creates  definite  constraints,  and  it  is  to  these  constraints  that
social networks respond. Being a body means
• Being tied to the “here” and “now.” Social interaction thus normally
requires two or more bodies together in a shared space, and that takes
effort on various levels. Traditionally, there have been ways of evading
this  constraint,  by sending  letters  or  making  phone  calls.  But  these
forms  of  communication  are  clearly  derivative,  building  on  and
preparing for actual meetings in the flesh. Virtual social relations are
different  since  they  often  begin  and  remain  in  virtual  space,  thus
turning into an original rather than derivative form.22 
• Being tied to this particular body. As most of us perceive our body as
imperfect, our corporeality imposes constraints on social relations, not
merely  but  perhaps  predominantly  where  an  erotic  dimension  is
involved. While social networks tend to involve photographs, they do
not have to; furthermore, I can select the photograph of myself and in
this way exercise significant control over how I appear. 
• Being  exposed  to  tiredness,  exhaustion,  and  other  bodily  states  in
which  we  seek  the  comfort  of  the  home.  Of  course,  one  might
immediately want to object that people engage in social networking not
just  from  home  but,  especially  due  to  the  new  generation  of
smartphones,  tablets  and  phablets,  from  anywhere.  However,  the
phenomenological notion of home is not limited to one’s house, but can
be any location in which I make myself comfortable with myself and for
myself. A genuine social relation with others, in contrast, requires me
to  enter  a  shared  space.23 It  can  also  mean  being  hospitable  and
21 «Seit ein Gespräch wir sind und hören können voneinander»,  HÖLDERLIN 1953, p. 430;  HEIDEGGER
1996, p. 39.
22 One further indication that social networks are conceived as an original rather than derivative form
of sociality is the extent to which virtual reality becomes the topic of actual conversations. Although
I do not have any empirical data to confirm this estimate, it seems to me that at least half of the
conversations amongst infant and primary school children nowadays focus on various forms of
virtuality (mostly gaming, but the predominant gaming platforms have social network dimensions
built into them, such as Bin Wheevils).
23 Phenomenologically speaking, a person completely immersed in her social media while travelling
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opening my home to the Other, as I will discuss at the end of this essay.
Each  of  these  restrictions  of  embodied  existence  could  be  explored
further, and similar features could be established.
At this point we could imagine the proponent of social media asking: but is it
not  amazingly  liberating  to  overcome  those  restrictions?  Yes:  it  is  all  too
liberating. Moving in virtual space means being, in a certain way, able to leave
my body. Not physically, of course, but inasmuch as my focus, my possibilities
and my experience  are  concerned.  From the phenomenological,  experience-
based perspective, this would indeed constitute leaving my body. However, my
body can announce itself by way of discomforts and needs, and thus interrupt
my virtual experience; and we will see more closely in the next subsection how
the escape provided by virtuality is indeed illusory.
It  is understandable that leaving one’s own body temporarily can be very
attractive and appealing. Why would this be problematic? First of all, we need
to remember again that designating a dimension as inauthentic does not mean
designating it as bad. Yet it is somewhat problematic to become engrossed in
this form of sociality, if only because it is so addictive. It is addictive partly
because it  is  attractive  (due to  the  advantages  of  inauthenticity  as  outlined
above) and partly because of certain self-perpetuating features possessed by
social networking. This addictive power can be elucidated with the help of an
essay  by  David  Foster  Wallace  entitled  E  Unibus  Pluram:  Television  and  US
Fiction. In this essay, Wallace describes an addiction as “malign” if «(1) it causes
real problems for the addict, and (2) it offers itself as a relief from the very
problem it causes».24 The second feature strikes me as more important and less
vague than the first. Wallace explains how television is particularly attractive to
those people who have difficulties relating to others, often because they do not
feel  very  confident  or  very  attractive  to  others.  As  a  result  of  watching
television, they feel even less attractive because those whom they watch on TV
tend to be not just physically more attractive, but also smarter, wittier, cooler,
more at ease, etc. 
One might object that social networks differ from television in that respect,
since  they  feature  “normal”  people  rather  than  actors.  That  is  true;  but
comparing happens nonetheless. Everybody tries to present themselves at their
best  in  social  networks.  This  is  where  the  aforementioned  feature  of
distantiality  comes in:  I  try  to  not  fall  back behind others.  Furthermore,  as
David  Foster  Wallace  points  out,  television  and  similar  virtual  spaces  are
on public transport is still a person locked up in her home rather than sharing space in the social
public.
24 WALLACE 1998 [1993], p. 38.
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particularly attractive to those people who are self-conscious, shy, agoraphobic,
or in other ways apprehensive about public places and social contexts. In these
cases,  the  self-perpetuating  character  of  staying  in  one’s  home  and
experiencing  others  in  the  virtual  realm  becomes  particularly  obvious.  The
more I see beautiful, confident, charming people on television, the more self-
conscious I become about my own shortcomings. The more I relate to others
through virtual social networks, the more difficult it will become to function in
actual social spaces.25 If my difficulties in this respect made virtuality attractive
to me in the first place, then these difficulties can only be exacerbated by my
immersion in social networking.  
From the Heideggerian perspective, we need to be mindful of the possibility
of entering into a purely ontical26 – in this case, psychological – argument. We
are not interested in identifying those who are, on account of their psyche or
personality,  more  drawn  to  television  or  social  networks  than  others.27
Existential  phenomenology  seeks  to  identify  determining  structures  of  our
existence, ontological structures that define our being, not ontical differences
between personalities. Yet upon closer consideration, those general existential
structures are indeed at stake here. Although some of us thrive in the social
realm while others find social contexts difficult,  being-with is in any case a
defining feature of our existence. Being-with is the realm of being with other
Dasein, that is, relating to those whose existence has the same general character
as mine. Others are also directed at the world and experience this shared space
as a realm that is intriguing and that offers multiple possibilities, and at the
same time, as a realm that is fundamentally uncanny. I will never be able to
fully make sense of world. This is at least partly due to the fact that others
shape world and have always already shaped world when I come into it. My
world and my existence are thus fundamentally influenced by others. Even on
this  basic  level,  there  are  already  indications  that  others  are  the  most
interesting things  in  the  world,  much more enigmatic  than objects  that  are
ready-to-hand or present-at-hand. 
Because of the special place they have in relation to my world (and for several
other reasons, some of which we will see below), others affect me more than
anything in the world. They affect me in various ways, making me happy or
25 WALLACE 1998 [1993], p. 38.
26 The ontical realm is the realm of beings in their diversity and concerns the perspective we usually
take on them, whereas the ontological level examines their being or existence. Ontological enquiry
is thus concerned with the being of beings. These distinctions need not be examined here in too
much depth, and it should become obvious from the present paragraph how they are relevant to the
argument.
27 For a discussion of the relation between these media, see BOLTER ET AL. 2000.
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upset, excited or angry, intrigued or irritated. Sociality means being exposed to
these diverse affects. The psychological differences mentioned above, that is,
differences of being fearful of others or comfortable with them, concern the
extent to which we are aware of the substantial impact others have on us. They
also stem from our personal histories and the experiences we have had with
others; yet these are, again, at an ontical level, which is of no particular interest
here. Nonetheless, the observation about the enormous impact which others
have on our lives and our affects holds true for existence in general.  
It thus seems plausible to claim that social networks are so attractive because
sociality is in general both utterly intriguing and precarious. Moreover, there is
an urge to protect myself in relation to my sociality, to be able to withdraw into
my  home,  which  is  a  general  existential  desire  even  though  it  ontically
manifests itself more strongly in some than in others. Social networks are so
appealing because they fulfil both our desire for sociality (given that others are
the most interesting thing in the world)  and our desire to be protected in our
home (given that others affect us most).
2.2 The Illusion of Escape
We have seen why social networks are so attractive and so addictive. The next
question  is,  do  they  work?  Do  they  indeed  fulfil  the  double  function  of
satisfying both the desires outlined above? The current essay argues that they
do not – for at least three reasons.
a.) Social networks still leave us vulnerable, and the safety of the home is in
many ways an illusion. There is an impression that social networks are more
manageable and allow for an easier withdrawal from sociality. Nonetheless, if I
am affected adversely, my distress is not virtual, but real. There are two ways in
which people think they might be able to escape this vulnerability, but those
also prove illusory:
b.)  It  might  seem  that  social  networks  are  less  public  than  actual  social
spaces, but they are in certain ways even more public. What happens to me in
virtual reality happens in front of witnesses, in front of third parties, in front of
“friends” and “followers”; it is passed on to friends of friends and potentially
to everybody. Others come to observe my social relations in virtual space. We
have already seen above that sociality is quantified in virtual  space,  so that
others can see how “likeable” I am, and this also adds to the addictive nature
of such networks. It is not just my image in terms of numbers that is at stake
here, although such numbers appear quite relevant in terms of comparability
and distantiality. Still more potent, on the level of affects, are hurtful words and
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compromising  pictures.  If  these  are  “posted”  in  front  of  witnesses  –  and
potentially in front of everybody – we start to see how it could come about that
real suicides and real murders are sometimes the result of virtual disclosing.
c.) It might seem that there is an easy way of protecting myself and my home
from virtual disclosure, namely by changing my identity. Some networks allow
for this more easily than others, yet regardless of how much effort is entailed
by taking on a modified identity in a network, interactive gaming platform, or
chatroom, there will still always be enough of me involved to be affected. There
is a difference between the experiencing me and the presented me, yet even
though  I  may  have  created  a  substantial  chasm  between  these  two,  the
experiencing me is still the one to respond to the situation, and if it gets hurt,
this affect is real. 
These findings are confirmed by psychological and sociological research on
the  subject,  including  empirical  studies.  Sherry  Turkle  has  observed  and
interviewed users of computers and social networks for over thirty years, and
in her most recent study she concludes that social networks are a response to
our human vulnerability and especially the fear of loneliness in combination
with the fear of others and of intimacy: «We defend connectivity as a way to be
close even as we effectively hide from each other».28 She concludes that we lose
crucial  interpersonal  skills  and  exacerbate  the  very  problems  that  social
networks were supposed to resolve. 
What is it that gets lost of sociality in these virtual encounters? This question
will be approached here by attending to a question that might well arise from
the considerations presented in this  article  so far,  a  question that voices an
objection: what about the obvious advantages of virtual space, especially for
women? Is it not a relief and asset to be able to stay in the safety of the home
rather  than  the  precariousness  of  public  spaces?  The  short  answer  is:  yes,
perhaps initially – but the transition to “real” social encounters will still have to
be  made,  at  least  on  certain  occasions,  and  then  it  becomes  all  the  more
difficult.  
It is important to note that such encounters, no matter how traumatising (in
the wider, non-clinical sense) they may be, are in any case inevitable. On the
ontical level, it is clear that staying entirely in one’s home and limiting social
encounters to virtual space amounts to a pathology. On the ontological level,
Emmanuel Levinas famously points out  that  the other is  always already in
me.29 This trope is  somewhat enigmatic,  and there are undoubtedly quite a
variety of possible interpretations, which cannot be considered here. But on the
28 TURKLE 2011, p. 281.
29 E.g., LEVINAS 1981, p. 69.
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most  basic level,  this  statement can be read as a reminder that others have
always already impacted me and shaped my life, and will continue to do so. 
Not only is world shared with others and shaped by others, but others are
crucial  because  they  have  the  same  world-relation  as  myself:  existence,  or
standing out into world. Since it is in any case impossible to escape from others
or to avoid them, it seems advisable to confront them, face-to-face, for better or
worse,  and  to  engage with  them.  The  more comfortable  we become in  the
alleged safety of virtual space – which is, as we have seen, only the illusion of
safety – the more difficult it becomes to adjust to others in the flesh. Social
networks place me at the centre of my universe and allow for a high level of
fantasy in my social relations. On the basis of how others present themselves, I
can fantasize about how I would be with them, and my presentation of myself,
or my “profile”, is based on how I would like to see myself and how I would
like others to see me. It is obvious that such self-controlled social fantasy space
gives little room for radical difference or for the Other to present themselves in
a truly other, surprising, unforeseeable fashion. Yet it is only by confronting the
Other that the trauma of the encounter with the Other can potentially turn into
wonder  at  the  Other.  Wonder  can  inspire  philosophy,  and  in  a  different
historical world (namely, the Ancient Greek world), it has. Wonder can also
open up world to me as a dimension that exceeds the limits of virtual space as
an illusory retreat. 
3. World
In order to see the potential of inauthenticity as a non-normative concept more
fully, we need to move beyond the more “individualistic” reading of Being and
Time,  which  invites  misunderstandings  like  those  discussed  in  previous
sections,  towards  a  reading  that  identifies  inauthenticity  as  a  social
phenomenon. More precisely, the suggestion put forth here is to read specific
manifestations of inauthenticity as symptomatic of a certain historical world. 
The question would then no longer be, “Should I or should I not subscribe to
social  networks?” but  rather,  “What does  it  reveal  about our contemporary
world that social networks have become such a pervasive form of sociality?”
We have already seen that the concept of sociality behind such manifestations
involves a high level of control and fantasy on my part. In terms of the “vulgar”
or mundane understanding of our historical world, this is part of what (usually
older)  people  complain  about  when  they  describe  current  society  as
“individualistic”. But how can we approach the state of our current historical
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world in a more philosophical fashion? What philosophical diagnosis can be
provided that would explain and stand behind the mundane characterisation
of society as individualistic?
Although it would be a very interesting task to respond to these questions
with the help of Heidegger’s philosophy, there is too much provisional work
necessary to provide the grounds for such an exploration.30 Instead, I  draw
upon  two  phenomenologists  who  allow  for  a  more  straightforward
phenomenology of the historical world, namely Hegel and Husserl. The crucial
concept that Hegel and Husserl allow us to introduce and explore is that of a
crisis of the historical world. Inauthentic forms of existence, so we may suspect,
would become manifest in a sense of crisis. 
3.1 Crisis
How can  crisis  be  made  plausible  as  a  philosophical  concept,  that  is,  as  a
“concept” in the genuine sense (where concept or Begriff, for Hegel, implies a
means  that  is  crucial  to  grasping  the  nature  of  world Spirit  at  a  historical
moment),  such  that  it  contains  enough  “rigour”  (Strenge,  as  requested  by
Husserl  for  any  theory  that  qualifies  as  philosophy)  for  a  philosophical
analysis? Without entering into a full philosophical discussion of the complex
term “crisis”, let me simply indicate how, for Hegel and Husserl, a crisis of the
historical world becomes noticeable. For Hegel, a crisis of an historical world
occurs  when  there  is  a  clash  between  «inner  striving  and  outer  reality». 31
Within the Hegelian framework, such a clash between thought and reality is
productive, since it brings about a dialectical development in which reality is
transformed in such a way as to eventually resolve the clash. The initial driving
power, according to Hegel, is the idea of freedom, which becomes prominent in
philosophy and leads to a corresponding transformation of reality. 
Probably the most problematic result of Hegelian philosophy is the idea that
this  dialectical  development  ultimately  leads  to  a  state  in  which  crisis  is
overcome such that thought (or in Hegel’s terms, Spirit) and reality become
reconciled.  For  Husserl,  in  contrast,  there  is  no  philosophical  reason  or
necessity as to why history would be a development of progress. The crisis that
he  describes  as  a  crisis  of  the  European  sciences  is  a  crisis  of  European
humanity (as the title of his original Vienna lecture has it) and is due to the
30 Heidegger’s  works  on  enframing (Gestell)  and technology would  be  crucial  here,  as  would his
considerations on the history of Being as they are prepared for in the relevant sections on world-
history in Being and Time. Yet this material is itself too complex and interwoven with a number of
even more difficult concepts to be useful here.
31 HEGEL 1974, p. 71.
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enormous role which the sciences play for our understanding of world; yet it is
a crisis which has its beginnings in Ancient Greece.32 It is a crisis that emerges
from a one-sided interpretation of the world, which has its origins in the Greek
focus  on unified,  single,  objective  ideas  at  the  expense  of  subjective,  plural
appearances. The Greeks also developed the basic mathematical frameworks
that allowed for the mathematization of nature, which Husserl identifies in the
modern era and links to the name of Galileo Galilei, though the latter features
only as an exemplar of a general trend. 
These Husserlian considerations, presented here only in the most truncated
form,  are  relevant  for  our  purposes  because  of  the  character  of  crisis  as
identified by Husserl.  The crisis  emerges because of  one-sided explanations
that prioritise quantification and objectivity as delivered by mathematics.  A
similar  emphasis  on objectivity  and precision plays  out  in  social  networks.
Firstly, there is the quantification of social relations that comes with measuring
friends, clicks, and likes, as explained above. In addition, there is a sense in
which the virtual world is, in general, neatly structured and organised in terms
that create an impression of accessibility, equality and fairness, due to the fact
that the rules are clear and apply to everybody. For this reason, social networks
appear non-threatening; but as we have seen above, the affects they evoke are
entirely real and are by no means limited to the positive. Furthermore, clear
rules  do  not  exclude  possibilities  of  violation,  subversive  action,  mobbing,
exposure,  or identity theft  –  and the problem is  exacerbated because all  of
these happen in front of an audience, as outlined above. 
At its basis, the virtual world is built on numbers, or rather, digits. We do not
need  to  understand  how  computers  work  to  take  full  advantage  of  social
networks  and other  services.  Yet  the  point  remains  that  just  as  the  natural
sciences, due to their basic reliance on mathematics, only allow for a certain
presentation  and  interpretation  of  world,  so  the  virtual  world  in  all  its
colourfulness nonetheless inherits certain limitations from the way it functions
at  its  basis,  including  a  certain  “flatness”  despite  all  the  pretence  of  three
dimensionality. Complex discussions about artificial intelligence and emotions
as well as the pop versions of such debates in science fiction films (such as
Blade Runner)  testify to this.  Its  basic neutrality,  accessibility,  objectivity and
rule-organisation  make  the  virtual  world  utterly  attractive  and  create  an
illusion of manageability, equality and control. Yet even the term “networking”
points to the significant impact of connections and power.
Returning to the Hegelian definition of crisis, we can see how the attractive
32 HUSSERL 1970.  The  original  Vienna  lecture  on  which  the  Crisis  study  is  based  comes  as  a
supplementary text in the volume and bears the title Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity.
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and addictive power of the virtual world in general (and of social networks in
particular) may create a pull that leads not into a dialectical development of
transforming  reality  so  as  to  be  better  adjusted  to  thought,  but  creates  a
dimension of  evasion that  allows us  to  turn away from reality.  The virtual
world appears much more organised, predictable and readable than the real
world,  and  it  is  sufficiently  deep  and  complex,  especially  given  its  social
dimension, to pull us away from reality.  If  the Hegelian concept of crisis is
applied,  yet  thought  is  concerned  not  with  philosophy  but  with  a  virtual
replacement for reality, we might be led into a development not of progress,
but  standstill,  or  perhaps  even  to  a  decline,  as  far  as  the  real  world  is
concerned. Although there continues to be a mismatch, this clash will not be
immediately noticeable if the virtual world is sufficiently engaging. Yet in the
longer run, it will become noticeable if crucial aspects of our existence remain
eclipsed  or  neglected,  such  as  aesthetic,  emotional,  social  and  historical
dimensions. This leads us back to the question of how a phenomenology of the
historical world is possible.
3.2 Our Historical World
The  current  article  argues  that  phenomenology  as  pursued  by  Husserl,
Heidegger, Derrida and others indeed accomplishes an account of the historical
world. To see more closely how a phenomenology of the historical world can be
possible, we need to follow Husserl’s train of thought a bit further to see how
the claim about neglected dimensions of existence relates to our topic of social
networks. Husserl admits that the sciences’ history of success makes it difficult
to see the significance of marginalised dimensions beyond a vague sense of
there being something missing. In order to search for the forgotten dimension,
he  proposes  considering  Helmholtz’s  image  of  two-dimensional  creatures
which are unaware of the existence of a third dimension.33 Husserl’s idea is that
the  world  explanation  provided  by  the  natural  sciences  has  an  internal
consistency that creates the impression of a complete plane in which to move –
yet  something,  a  wholly other dimension, is  missing. According to Husserl,
that is the dimension of subjectivity, which creates and gives meaning to what
is happening in the plane.
Transposed to our topic, the image of a missing dimension appears useful
because social networks indeed create an impression of a complete world of
sociality.  Yet upon closer inspection,  depth is  missing:  namely, the depth of
encounters with others in the flesh. This depth is created by the impact of the
33 HUSSERL 1970, p. 118 ff.
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Other on my affective life, for better or worse, and the potential of the Other to
deeply and truly surprise me. The “crisis” this lack brings about is a crisis of
continuing loneliness, despite all the “social” involvement. This is the case also
because the plane of  sociality that  social  networks open up remains  a  self-
centred world, a world that gives the impression of an opening to the Other
and yet remains ultimately my plane that I organise around me, surveying and
exploring it as I see fit. In the language of literary theory, the characters of this
plane are all “flat” characters, and their shortcomings in comparison to me as
the only “round” character do not go unnoticed.
However, is it even permissible to apply Husserl’s thoughts to our current
historical world? The suggestion that the crisis as identified by Husserl is not
just a crisis that has been in the making since the emergence of science with the
Ancient  Greeks  (as  explained  above),  but  also  continues  to  be  our
contemporary crisis stands at odds with at least one crucial dimension of the
crisis as identified by Husserl: the medical idea of crisis as a turning point, that
is,  a  critical  state  that  will  lead  to  either  recovery  or  deterioration,  and
potentially even to death. In other words, if the concept of crisis were such that
there is always a crisis of sorts –  albeit one that manifests itself differently
throughout history and is evoked by different paradigms – is the name “crisis”
still justified? 
To resolve this difficulty, it may prove helpful to invoke a Hegelian concept of
crisis and history (even if not exactly Hegel’s). Perhaps we are dealing with a
dialectical development in the broadest sense; that is, not in the sense of any
(continuous) progress, but in the sense of the emergence of a new historical
world after each crisis.  The new world (in the phenomenological  sense of a
meaningful context) would be a transformation of the previous in an attempt to
overcome certain problems, but would still remain linked to the previous shape
of world. The new historical world could be called a new epoch, bearing in
mind  that  the  concept  of  epoché, which  proves  so  crucial  for  Husserl’s
philosophy, includes a suspension of an old belief system that gives rise to new
paradigms. This new historical world with its transformed paradigm does not
emerge out of nowhere, but constitutes precisely a continuation of the previous
one,  modified  in  accordance  with  the  crisis.  In  our  case,  this  might  be  a
continuation of the paradigm of mathematization, but no longer with a major
emphasis  on  the  natural  sciences,  which  have  proven  sufficiently
incomprehensible  that  the  everyday  person  can  deal  merely  with  their
products  and  can  only  take  these  in  a  predominantly  consumerist  fashion.
Although  new  paradigms  usually  become  more  visible  in  retrospect,  the
current  one  seems  definitely  to  involve  a  powerful  combination  and  close
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linkage  of  economics  and  politics.  The  worship  of  numbers  has  taken  an
extreme shape in which money, bonds and shares have become increasingly
detached from what they represent. This detachment has made it possible to
make money from money in such a fashion that simply contemplating this
process creates a sense of intellectual vertigo. Yet for some reason, we remain
convinced that there would be a change to the worse (in terms of our self-
gratification) if such boundless capitalism were to be prohibited or significantly
restricted. Given the close alliance, since Ancient times, between politics and
rhetoric,  it  is  of  little  surprise  that  there  is  such reluctance  to  question the
current economic paradigm.34 
The reader might at this point be shaking his or her head in disbelief, given
that social networks and media are often perceived as a way of overcoming
political propaganda and organising political resistance.35 Yet there seems to be
no clear reason why these ends could not be achieved through a different kind
of  electronic  publication,  such  as  an  ordinary  website.  In  the  case  of  an
ordinary webpage,  the  publicness  is  well  known and can be  considered  in
designing it.36 In contrast, the deceptive character of the publicness involved in
social  networks,  along with their  potential  for  forging identities,  for  virtual
mobbing,  the  misplaced  focus  on  quantification  and their  overall  addictive
nature are the main reasons for focussing on them in this article. 
Secondly, in line with the emphasis on historical worlds as explored here, it
might  be  worthwhile  remembering  the  origins  of  political  engagement  in
actual social discussions, for which the Greek marketplace (agora) functioned as
more than a metaphor. The underlying political issues are too complex for the
current  article.  Among  many  other  problems,  we  might  have  adopted  an
unacknowledged  Hegelian  assumption  of  exactly  the  kind  which  nobody
would openly want to accept nowadays, namely, the assumption that there is
only one  telos to  world history. This time, however,  the realisation of world
Spirit would presumably have happened in the United States. Those who have
not reached this  telos are, according to this conception, simply not there  yet –
that is, they are stuck at an earlier level of Spirit and thus in need of spiritual
rescue.37 Such  rescue  always  happens  in  the  name  of  freedom,  a  concept
34 Financier  Nicolas  Berggruen  states  in  an  interview:  “The  financial  industry  produces  financial
weapons of mass destruction” (Worth. Issue October/November 2012).
35 For an example of this position, see MASON 2012. 
36 Another question worth exploring, which has to be left open here, concerns the nature of a work
(Werk), in which Heidegger locates the nature of art. A work would be that which can stand in itself,
or be without its father or creator. A literary text on the Internet displayed as a work – that is, in
itself – can be such a thing. Yet there are certain things, be they statements, proclamations, or styles,
which simply should not be left to stand in themselves.
37 The question as to whether there are any alternatives to such a mono-teleology is too complex for
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impossible to reject yet so extremely difficult to understand. Jean-Luc Nancy
has suggested that all concepts of freedom in the political realm are based on a
much deeper concept of freedom, which is synonymous with existence or at
least  emerges  naturally  from  it.  Such  a  concept  of  freedom  calls  for  an
investigation of who we are on the most basic level, in our existence as a social
animal or as creatures for whom being with others is a crucial dimension of
existence. 
Furthermore,  we  are  coming  to  learn  that  virtual  space  is  the  realm  of
complete transparency. This might not be actually the case, but it is the case in
principle. The American NSA and British SIS, most likely a number of other
national  secret  services,  and  numerous  hackers  around  the  world  can  in
principle have access to everything we do and say online. We have recently
learned that the NSA has used Facebook to obtain information about people.
Most likely, the majority of us are not actually interesting enough for anybody
to pay attention; yet this  does not  change the fact that there is  in principle
complete transparency in virtual space.38 
Yet we are also creatures who request and give hospitality to one another,
and as Jacques Derrida rightly points out, there cannot be hospitality if there is
complete  transparency  and  thus  no  possibility  of  forming  and  offering  a
home.39 It  is  certainly  an  interesting  and ironic  twist  of  fate  that  the  most
pervasive social network, Facebook, is apparently now at risk of becoming less
popular due to the discomfort brought about by the fact that “one”’s parents
are also on Facebook (since the older generation proves less old-fashioned than
expected and/or desired, and is for valid reasons open to the addictive powers
fuelled  by  the  illusion  of  overcoming  the  limitations  of  corporeality).  The
significance of the distinction between public and private is thus proven yet
again. If this distinction is undermined, we lose much of what we can be to
each other.
the current article. Husserl’s idea of a teleology in history does not imply the idea of just one telos,
but of various  teloi that can be modified over time. In that sense, a historical epoch might also be
characterised  by  its  defining  telos,  or  set  thereof.  DERRIDA 2005  calls  for  a  more  radical
reconceptualization, asking us to think beyond what he calls «teleologism». On the level of more
practical political considerations, BERGGRUEN & GARDELS 2013 suggest that there could be an Eastern
alternative to the Western idea of competing political systems in which the point is to convert the
other. This alternative would be a balance where opposed systems hold each other in place, so to
speak (and might even help each other to self-critique). 
38 It is worth noting, though it is probably going to remain inconsequential, that the European Court
of Justice has in April 2014 ruled the universal retention of data illegal.
39 DERRIDA 2000.
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